

NPI licensing by FORCE_U features*

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
1. Introduction

This paper proposes a new analysis of the licensing condition on the so-called negative polarity items (NPIs) and derives their well-known distributional properties such as c-command, intervention, and downward entailment from this new analysis. The main proposal to be pursued in this paper is that NPIs are FORCE_U variables and the FORCE_U variables must ultimately be connected to C with a FORCE_U feature, which is a C-head that always takes as its TP complement a proposition that has not been established to be true in the relevant discourse.


- (1) a. NPIs are FORCE_U variables.
- b. A FORCE_U variable must ultimately be connected to C with a FORCE_U feature.

FORCE is a cover term for various kinds of information that C carries such as a question, a declarative, an exclamative, and so on. The set of information is called “force” in Chomsky (1995) and “type” in Cheng (1991). I will use the term FORCE just for the sake of simplicity. Rizzi (1997) elaborates the notion of FORCE and proposes the following complementizer system, along the spirit of the “split IP hypothesis” put forth by Pollock (1989).

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Instead of this articulated C system, however, this paper assumes a simple CP structure in (3) with the option of multiple Specifiers.



C is the place where various FORCE features are licensed. The list of instances of FORCE features includes: a question, a declarative, an exclamative, an imperative, a relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind (such as a conditional), a topic, a focus, a negative. Of these FORCE features, some are licensed clause-internally and others clause-externally. In matrix *yes/no* questions, for example, the question-FORCE feature is licensed in relation with the relevant discourse, whereas in embedded *yes/no* questions the feature is licensed by the selecting predicate. In this sense, the complementizer system can be viewed as “the interface between a propositional content (expressed by the IP) and the superordinate structure (a higher clause or, possibly, the articulation of discourse, if we consider a root clause)” (Rizzi 1997: 283).

Given this unifying role of the C system, we can characterize the domains that license NPIs as a proper subset of the set of CP domains defined by FORCE features. To be specific, I will claim that NPIs are licensed by C with a FORCE feature that takes an “unestablished” proposition, or simply FORCE_U. This paper attempts to derive the distribution/licensing of NPIs in what Ladusaw (1980) calls downward entailing (DE) domains as well as those NPIs located in the scope of negation, from the FORCE nature of the C by which NPIs are c-commanded.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the formalization of the licensing mechanism of FORCE_U variables. It is claimed that FORCE_U variables can be unselectively bound by an operator and that the FORCE_U variables have to be connected to C with a FORCE_U feature via movement. Section 3 considers NPI licensing in what Ladusaw (1980) call downward-entailing domains. It is argued that NPIs in these domains are uniformly licensed by C with a FORCE_U feature. Section 4 is a conclusion.

2. FORCE_U -variables

2.1. The FORCE_U -based analysis

Given that NPIs are FORCE_U -variables, the following property follows from it.

- (4) a. Since NPIs are variables, they must be bound; otherwise, a violation of free variable would arise.
 b. Since NPIs have FORCE_U features, they must be connected to the C system.

An immediate consequence of (4a) is the so-called intervention effect observed with NPIs. Compare the following sentences.

- (5) a. *John doesn't always call anyone. (Szabolcsi 2004)
 b. *I don't think that every boy has any potatoes. (Horn & Lee 1995)
 c. *John didn't give every charity any money. (Horn & Lee 1995)
- (6) a. John doesn't call anyone.
 b. I don't think that John has any potatoes.
 c. John didn't give the charity any money.

NPIs are not operators; rather, they are variable that undergo unselective binding by the nearest operators. In (5a)-(5c), NPIs are unselectively bound by *always*, *every boy* and *every charity*, respectively. As a result, FORCE_U -variables form "FORCE-chains" with the operators that do not have FORCE_U features; and we have a type-mismatch in (5a)-(5c). On the other hand, NPIs in (6a)-(6c) are unselectively bound by *doesn't*, *don't* and *didn't*, respectively. Negative operators take a proposition that is not established to be true, so that they are compatible with the feature FORCE_U . Then, in (6a)-(6c), unselective binding of NPIs by negation creates FORCE-chains that are uniform in the light of FORCE_U fea-

tures.

The original cases of the intervention effect that Linebarger (1987) discusses are illustrated in (7) and (8).¹

(7) She didn't wear any earrings to every party.

i. *Not Ay Ex (she wore *x* to *y*)

It wasn't to every party that she wore any earrings.

ii. Ay NOT Ex (she wore *x* to *y*)

For each party (*y*), it was to *y* that she didn't wear any earrings.

iii. NOT Ex Ay (she wore *x* to *y*)

There are no earrings that she wore to every party.

(8) *He didn't budge an inch because he was pushed, but because he fell.

Sentence (7) has the following configuration.

(9) [_{TP} she [_T didn't][_{VP} she *v* [_{VP} any earrings [_V wear [to every party]]]]]

NPI (*any earrings*) is directly c-commanded by *didn't*; just as in the cases of (6a)-(6c), it is licitly connected to an operator with a FORCE_U feature. If the universal quantifier (*every party*) stays within the scope domain of the negation, then we get the interpretation in (7iii). If it takes wider scope, on the other hand, we have the interpretation given in (7ii). In order to obtain the interpretation in (7i), however, we would have to connect *any earrings* to *every party*, which is impossible because of the configuration they appear in: the nearest binder of the NPI cannot be *every party*. Therefore, our analysis gives a principled account of the lack of the interpretation in (7i).

In (8), the negative polarity expression (*budge an inch*) is c-commanded by *didn't* and they form a licit FORCE_U chain in the light of (4a). Since FORCE is a characteristic of the C system, it is quite natural to hypothesize that the FORCE_U chain, headed by negation, is connected to the matrix C, as stated in (4b), and that this process guarantees that the

¹ Linebarger (1987: 338) formulates the relevant constraint as in (i).

(i) The Immediate Scope Constraint

A negative polarity item is acceptable in a sentence S if in the LF of S the subformula representing the NPI is in the immediate scope of NOT only if (a) it occurs in a position that is the entire scope of NPI, and (b) within this proposition there are no logical elements intervening between it and NOT.

sentence is interpreted as a negative sentence. If this is on the right track, then we cannot get the “not X but Y” interpretation that the sentence in (8) originally intends to convey, where the person that *he* refers to is understood to have shifted his posture.

Let us here take a look at the relevant mechanism more closely. Consider why the following sentence is excluded as ungrammatical.

(10) *Anyone didn't invite John. (Progovac 1994)

We cannot appeal to the failure of *didn't* to c-command *anyone*, because such a failure is obtained only at the “surface structure”. From a derivational point of view, *anyone* is c-commanded, and hence unselectively bound, by *didn't* at a relatively earlier stage of the derivation, illustrated in (11a). Here, *didn't* and *anyone* form a licit FORCE_U chain. Later, *anyone* internally merges with the whole TP, yielding the structure in (11b), where the raised *anyone* is no longer c-commanded by *didn't*.

(11) a. [_{TP} [_T didn't] [_{vP} anyone [_{v'} v [_{VP} invite John]]]]
 b. [_{TP} anyone [_T [_T didn't] [_{vP} ~~anyone~~ [_{v'} v [_{VP} invite John]]]]]

Therefore, the ill-formedness of (10) could not be attributed to a failure of *didn't* to licitly bind *anyone*. It is natural to contend that these FORCE_U chains are licensed at a Complementizer system, as stated in (4b), because FORCE_U features are properties of the C system by definition. This idea can be implemented in the following way.

(12) A FORCE_U chain (F₁, ..., F_n) is connected to C iff F₁ is (adjoined to) C.

In the case of the derivation illustrated in (11), the condition in (12) requires the head of the FORCE_U chain (= *didn't*) to be adjoined to C at LF. This LF adjunction of *didn't* to C is, however, blocked by the presence of the non-initial member of the FORCE_U chain (namely, *anyone*) in a position structurally superior than *didn't*, as illustrated in (13).²

² One might argue that since *anyone* in [Spec,TP] and *didn't* in T are equidistant from the probe (C), either may be licitly chosen as the goal. If this is the case, we can expect *didn't* to undergo LF movement to adjoin to C, satisfying the condition in (12). However, see Ochi (2008), who proposes that equidistance is available/operative only during the stages of the derivation where a c-commanding phase head is not introduced. In (13), the relevant structure is the one in which a phase head (C) is introduced. This is why a configurational differentiation of *anyone* from *didn't* is obtained.

- (13) [_{CP} C [_{TP} anyone [_T [_T didn't] [_{vP} ...

Let me note here that *anyone* cannot move to adjoin to C. This is because it is not a quantifier and as a result it does not have an ability to initiate (LF) movement by itself.

In sum, starting with the variable nature of NPIs, we have established the following licensing system for FORCE_U features of NPIs.


- (14) a. Being a FORCE_U-variable, an NPI is bound by whatever operator c-commands it (if there is one).
 b. If the local binder does not have a FORCE_U feature, then a type-mismatch arises.
 c. The head element of the FORCE_U chain that has an NPI as its member must be connected to C through movement, if such a connection has not yet been established.
 d. Since NPIs are not operators, they cannot initiate LF movement by themselves.

2.2. Anti-c-command contexts

Let us consider anti-c-command contexts extensively discussed by Nishioka (2007).

- (15) a. Pictures of anyone did not seem to be available.
 b. A good solution to any of these problems does not exist.
 (16) a. That anyone might do anything like that never occurred to him.
 b. That anybody would leave the company wasn't mentioned in the meeting.

First, the schematic structure for (15a) and (15b) is something like (17), where DP_i within *vP* has undergone A-movement to [Spec, TP].



The NPI within vP is c-commanded, and hence bound, by negation in T, so that a $FORCE_U$ chain is successfully formed. At a later stage of the derivation, the DP that includes the NPI undergoes A-movement to [Spec,TP]. One crucial difference between the configuration in (17) and the one in (13) we saw above is that in the latter the raised NPI does c-command negation, but not in the former. In (17), neither NPI nor negation c-commands the other. Therefore, the head of the $FORCE_U$ chain (= negation), which is a quantifier, can undergo LF movement to C.

An essentially similar analysis is available for the well-formedness of sentences like (16a) and (16b).³

Chain formation of an NPI and a $FORCE_U$ operator is not mediated by movement but by c-command. This means that the establishment of binding relation between them may be achieved long distance. It is therefore expected that a licit $FORCE_U$ chain is created in the following cases, cited again from Nishioka (2007).

- (18) a. A doctor who knew anything about acupuncture was not available.
 b. A messiah who would bring any home didn't appear to the Jews.

Let us now turn to another type of anti-c-command context that Nishioka discusses:

- (19) a. I gave pictures of no one to anyone.
 b. Even the writers of none of the reports thought that any rain had fallen anywhere else.

In these examples, there is no c-command relation at all between NPIs and negative operators. Therefore, the NPIs are not bound by negation during the overt component. In the covert component, the negative operators undergo LF-movement and adjoin to C. After this operation, the NPIs are c-commanded, and hence unselectively bound, by the C-adjoined negation. Now that the NPIs form licit $FORCE_U$ chains with the C-adjoined negation and that the negation has already been adjoined to C, the $FORCE_U$ chains so created have been licitly connected to C.

³ Let me note in passing that the present analysis presupposes that the sentence-initial *that*-clause has a "reconstruction" site within the domain c-commanded by negation in T. This means that sentential subjects are not always base-generated in topic positions. Cf. Koster (1978) and Alrenga (2005).

The difference in grammaticality between (20a) and (20b) reflects the success or failure of the establishment of connection to C of the FORCE_U chains headed by negation.

- (20) a. Which of the kids doesn't anyone like?
 b. *Which of the kids does anyone not like? (McCloskey 1997)

In (20b), just as in (13) above, LF movement of *not* to C is blocked by the presence of *anyone*, which is located in a position closer to C than *not* is. In (20a), on the other hand, the negation (*doesn't*) has connected to C by overt movement that is independently induced by the Q feature on C. To put it differently, the connection of the head of the FORCE_U chain to C in (20a) is achieved during the process of the feature-checking that has nothing to do with the interpretation of FORCE_U features.⁴

The contrast in grammaticality between (21a) and (21b), drawn from Ladusaw (1980), is also accounted for.

- (21) a. Rarely is anyone audited by the IRS.
 b. *Anyone is rarely audited by the IRS.

An essentially similar analysis accounts for the contrast in grammaticality between (22a) and (22b), on the one hand, and (23a) and (23b), on the other. (The examples are drawn from Progovac 1994.)

- (22) a. ?*John gave only his girlfriend any flowers.
 b. ?*John told only Mary about any books.
 (23) a. Only to his girlfriend did John give any flowers.
 b. Only last year did John get any grey hairs.

Only-phrases have dual functions in the sense that the relevant proposition is taken to be established to be true in relation with the individual/entity denoted by the DPs *only* modifies, but not in relation with all the other individuals/entities imaginable. In other

⁴ The well-formedness of the following sentences is also explained in the same way.

- (i) a. Didn't any one of you invite him?
 b. She didn't invite him; neither did any one of her friends.

words, *only*-phrases can be analyzed as having a FORCE_U-feature. They are potential binders of FORCE_U-variables, and actually form FORCE_U-chains with NPIs. However, *only*-phrases are not operators. This is why they do not have an inherent ability to move themselves to C. Since the FORCE_U chains are not connected to C, they are not properly interpreted.

In (23a) and (23b), on the other hand, *only*-phrases are assigned topic-features, which are attracted by EPP-feature on C. NPIs (*any flowers* in (23a) and *any grey hairs* in (23b)) are c-commanded, and hence bound, by the *only*-phrases, creating licit FORCE_U chains. Since the chains are connected to C during the feature-checking process of the topic-features on *only*-phrases, the resulting structures are properly interpreted.⁵

3. NPI licensing in non-negative contexts

NPIs are licensed by a variety of non-negative items, some of which are drawn from Linebarger (1987), Ladusaw (1980) and Progovac (1994):

- (24) Antecedents of conditionals
 - a. If you steal any food, they'll arrest you.
 - b. *If you steal food, they'll ever arrest you.
- (25) Comparatives
 - a. He was taller than we ever though he would be.
 - b. *He was so tall that we ever thought he would bump his head.
- (26) Adversative predicates
 - a. He refused to budge an inch.
 - b. *He promised to budge an inch.
 - c. I'm surprised that he ever speaks to her.
 - d. *I'm sure that he ever speaks to her.
 - e. I doubt that he much likes Louise.
 - f. *I think he much likes Louise.
- (27) *Only*

⁵ It is well known that NPIs are licensed by *only*-phrases in [Spec,TP], as illustrated by (i).

(i) Only Mary showed any respect for the visitors. (Progovac 1994)

To tackle with the well-formedness of this kind of examples, we have to consider the details of the special relation between C and T. In this respect, Chomsky's (2005) attempt is worth considering, though I will put the issue aside here.

- a . Only to his girlfriend did John give any flowers.
 - b . ?*John gave only his girlfriend any flowers.
- (28) Relative clauses headed by a universal quantifier
- a . Everyone who knows a damn thing about English knows that it's an SVO language.
 - b . *Someone who knows a damn thing about English knows that it's an SVO language.
- (29) Questions
- a . Have you ever met George?
 - b . *You have ever met George.

Ladusaw (1980) attempts to derive the paradigms in (24)-(29) from the nature of downward entailment. This is quite successful in the cases of, for example, antecedents of conditionals (24) and relative clauses with a universal quantifier (28). That antecedents of conditionals are downward-entailing contexts is indicated by the fact that in (30) below, the entailment proceeds from (30a), with the superset of pets, to (30b), the subset of cats.

- (30) a . If you have a pet, you will not be allowed in.
 b . If you have a cat, you will not be allowed in. (Progovac 1994)

Similarly, the entailment relation between (31a) and (31b) shows that a relative clause with a universal quantifier is another downward entailing context.

- (31) a . Everyone who has a pet will get in free.
 b . Everyone who has a cat will get in free. (Progovac 1994)

However, *yes/no* interrogative sentences are not downward-entailing contexts, as pointed out by Progovac (1994), who notes that Ladusaw himself has noticed it. This is obvious from the fact that (32a) does not “downwardly” entail (32b).

- (32) a . Do you have a pet?
 b . Do you have a cat?

In the analysis we pursue in this paper, by contrast, the contexts given in (24)-(29) form a natural class, which I will illustrate in what follows. First, consider negations and questions. Negative sentence (33a) below has an LF representation as in (33b), where C has a negative FORCE feature, to which *didn't* has adjoined. Here, the proposition that C_{NEG} takes (i.e. *John came to the party*) is never a proposition established to be true. This clearly shows that C with a negative FORCE takes a proposition that is not established to be true. Let us refer to such a proposition as an “unestablished proposition” for the sake of simplicity.

- (33) a. John didn't come to the party.
 b. [_{CP} didn't_i+C_{NEG} [_{TP} John T_i come to the party]]

Interrogative sentences also have C with an unestablished proposition. For example, (34a) has an LF representation (34b).

- (34) a. Did John come to the party?
 b. [_{CP} did+C_Q [_{TP} John T_i come to the party]]

C_Q takes a proposition: *John came to the party*. This proposition is not established to be true in the context that the relevant sentence is expressed. From this consideration, it can be concluded that negation and question form a natural class in the sense that they have FORCE features that require an unestablished proposition.

Bearing this in mind, let us now turn to the nature of FORCE features that provide contexts for other licit NPI licensing examples. Antecedents of conditionals, as we saw in (24), are viewed as contexts where the proposition that the relevant C with a conditional FORCE feature takes is an unestablished one:

- (35) a. If John come to the party, . . .
 b. [_{CP} C_{CONDITIONAL} [_{TP} John T come to the party]]

Similarly, clauses introduced by *before* provide another context where the TP selected by C represents a proposition that has not been established to be true at the moment when the matrix event that *before*-clauses modify takes place. It is expected that sen-

tences with an NPI in *before*-clauses are properly interpreted. This expectation is correctly borne out, as the well-formedness of sentence (36a) shows.

- (36) a. John left before he ate any vegetables. (Progovac 1993)
 b. [_{CP} C_{UNREALIZED} [_{TP} John T ate vegetables]]

(36a) contrasts sharply with (37), which has an NPI appear in an *after*-clause. *After*-clauses take a TP proposition that has been established to be true in the relevant discourse. Therefore, they are incompatible with NPIs.

- (37) *John left after he ate any vegetables. (Progovac 1993)

Let us now look at comparatives such as (38a). The comparative CP clause introduced by *than* has an empty operator in its Spec, with its value unspecified. Therefore, the proposition that the comparative C takes should be something like (38b).

- (38) a. Mary is taller than any girl in her class is. (Progovac 1993)
 b. [_{CP} C_{COMPARATIVE} [_{TP} any girl in her class T is *x*-much tall]]

The presence of unspecified value of height makes it impossible to evaluate the truth/false value of the proposition. As a result, NPIs are allowed to appear in this domain.

Relative clauses contain operators, just as comparative clauses. But the following example shows that relative operators apparently do not contribute to the licensing of NPIs, unlike comparative operators.

- (39) *Someone who has any pets will get in free. (Progovac 1993)

One crucial difference between relative operators and comparative operators is that the value of the former can be specified by the “antecedent” of the operators (*someone* in the case of (39)) whereas the value of the latter cannot be specified, as we saw in (38b).⁶ From this consideration, we will conclude that relative operators are not the key agents to license NPIs. With this in mind, let us examine the contrast in grammaticality between

⁶ Cf. Chomsky's (1986) strong binding.

(39) and (40).

(40) Everyone who has any pets will get in free. (Progovac 1993)

Suppose that P = the proposition (*x has any pets*) and Q = the proposition (*someone/everyone will get in free*). Then, (39) is represented as (41), while (40) is represented as (42).

(41) $\exists x (P \ \& \ Q)$

(42) $\forall x (P \rightarrow Q)$

In (42), the proposition P serves as the antecedent of a conditional. As we saw in the discussion of (35) above, antecedents of conditionals allow appearance of NPIs. This is why *any pets* in (40) is licit. In (41), on the other hand, the proposition P is a “regular” proposition and has no appropriate FORCE feature that can license an NPI.

Let us now turn to adversative predicates such as *refuse*, *surprised*, *doubt*. They take propositions that are “unexpected” in the relevant discourse. This semantic property is reflected on C these predicates take as their complement: C has a FORCE feature of “unexpected.” Because of this FORCE feature, the proposition it takes has to be one that is “unexpected,” whether it is actually true or not. Thus, example (43a) has an LF representation in (43b), where the TP proposition is treated as a proposition that has not been established to be true in the relevant discourse.

(39) a. I doubt that Mary trusts anyone. (Progovac 1993)

b. [_{CP} C_{UNEXPECTED} [_{TP} Mary T trusts anyone]]

Therefore, NPIs are allowed in the complement clause of these predicates.

Notice here that our analysis depends crucially on the FORCE feature of C. Therefore, just as Progovac (1993, 1994) notes, these predicates cannot license NPIs in sentences like (40a), since there is no C with an appropriate FORCE feature.

(40) a. *Mary forgot anything. (Progovac 1993)

b. Mary forgot that anyone visited her on Monday.

To summarize the discussion, there are a variety of FORCE features. Of these, only the features that take a complement proposition that has not been established to be true can license NPIs.

- (41) FORCE_U features (taking a proposition that has not been established to be true)
- a. negation
 - b. question
 - c. conditional (*if*, relative clauses)
 - d. unrealized (*before*-clauses)
 - e. comparative
 - g. unexpected (adversative predicates)

FORCE features that are listed in (42) do not license NPIs.

- (42) FORCE features that do not license NPIs
- a. declarative
 - b. topic
 - c. focus
 - d. exclamative
 - e. imperative

4. Conclusion

This paper argues that NPIs are FORCE_U variables and they are licensed by FORCE_U features. Since FORCE features are properties of C, NPIs are always licensed in the CP domain, just as Progovac (1993, 1994) convincingly argues for. It is shown that since FORCE_U includes not only negation and question but also a conditional, comparative, and other unexpected/unrealized FORCE, it accounts for the NPI-licensing domain that Ladusaw (1980) tries to derive from the notion of downward entailment.

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素性 FORCE_Uによる否定極性表現の認可

富 澤 直 人

否定極性表現（NPI）の認可条件に関する論考は、統語条件に係わるものと意味あるいは論理条件に係わるものの2つに大別することができる。前者は、NPIとその認可子（例えば否定辞）との構造上の位置関係を巡って研究が進められ、両者の直接的な c 統御関係ではなく、Cあるいはその指定部を舞台として成立する両者の c 統御関係が認可の可否を決定することを支持する証拠が提示されてきた。一方、後者の研究は、下方含意（downward entailment）の概念を中心に進められてきた。本稿は、(i) 節（TP）が担う命題情報とその上位節（あるいは主節の場合にはその命題が表現される談話）との接触領域としての機能を持っているのだと Rizzi (1997) が論じる「CP 領域」の特性（つまり、FORCE）の一部として、この下方含意の特性を捉えること、および、(ii) NPI は数量詞ではなく変更であり特定の演算子（FORCE_U）によって束縛を受けなければならないという2つの提案を行い、NPIの分布に関する一元的な説明モデルを提示する。