@article{oai:yamagata.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001115,
 author = {清塚,  邦彦},
 issue = {3},
 journal = {山形大学紀要. 人文科学 = Bulletin of Yamagata University. Humanities},
 month = {Feb},
 note = {論文(Article), The concept of 'observation sentences', which is first introduced in Word and Object (1960), has since been a key concept both in Quine's epistemology and in his theory of language. In his epistemo1ogy, this concept takes the place of that of subjective 'experiences' -the most basic epistemological notion in traditional empiricism- and paves the way for his physicalistic conception of empiricism. In his theory of language, our positive and negative reactions to observation sentences, checked behavioristically, are regarded to be all that matters in translation in generaI, banning the psychologicaI as well as platonistic conceptions of 'meaning'.　Despite its importance, the definitions given by Quine to the concept of 'observation sentences' are rather unsettled. In this paper, I examine Quine's complicated efforts to characterize this concept. As I see it, Quine's efforts were drivbn by two kinds of concern. One is the stress on the social character of language. The other is the naturalization of epistemology. I shall follow somewhat historically the forms of the conflict between these two concerns in his writings, from Word and Object to the latest ones, and determine the final form that Quine settled for.},
 pages = {23(240)--53(210)},
 title = {「観察文」の定義をめぐって : クワインの言語論と認識論},
 volume = {15},
 year = {2004}
}